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Abstract: The apparent mismatch between countries receiving Adaptation-related Climate Change 
Financing (ACCF) and those most vulnerable to climate change is a concern which is the motivation 
for this research. This paper examines the determining factors of receiving ACCF for sub-Saharan 
African countries and finds that the recipient policy and an existing aid relationship are significant 
determinants of funding. ACCF therefore appears to be contingent on democratic characteristics of the 
recipient and prevailing a donor-recipient relationship, with vulnerability not being a factor. Our 
research draws a parallel between ACCF and traditional, bilateral aid allocation, and stresses the 
importance of accurate climate finance allocation practices. 
 
 
Preface 
“We do not face a choice between protecting our environment or protecting our economy. We face a 
choice between protecting our economy by protecting our environment – or allowing environmental 
havoc to create economic havoc.” 
 
– Robert E. Rubin 
Co-Chairman, Council on Foreign Relations and Former United States Secretary of the Treasury 
 
In the lead up to the climate negotiations in Paris at the end of 2015, this quote seems particularly 
fitting. Climate change negotiations have long been stalled by the idea that compelling countries to cut 
their greenhouse gas emissions would be the death knell to their economies, all the while overlooking 
the idea that future economic prosperity will be contingent on the actions we take now to mitigate 
future effects of climate change and to adapt to its current effects. The latter is particularly relevant to 
lower income countries who have contributed the least to greenhouse gas emissions, but are 
disproportionately impacted by climate change through a limited capacity to adapt to its effects. 
Adaptation-related climate change financing is therefore pivotal for lower income countries. The 
apparent mismatch between countries receiving adaptation-related climate change financing and those 
most vulnerable to climate change is a concern. This concern is the motivation for this research.   
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Executive Summary 
The central aim of this paper is to ascertain the key determining factors for bilateral Adaptation-related 
Climate Change Finance (ACCF) to sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). In doing so this paper is divided into 
four chapters. The first chapter, the introduction, includes an outline of the context in which the 
research takes place, the research questions, and a review of relevant literature. The second chapter 
outlines the methodology, while the third chapter lays out the results and analysis, and the fourth 
chapter provides conclusions and recommendations.  
 
Chapter 1 begins by highlighting that there are scientific, social-political-economic and ethical 
conceptions of climate change. The first defines climate change as relating to “…how increasing 
greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations affect global temperatures, ocean chemistry, and vegetation and 
the associated impacts that emerge from these changes” (Hoffmann, 2013:4). The second 
conceptualisation includes contextual factors (Hoffmann, 2013). The third perspective includes 
specifications on areas that are currently most vulnerable to climate change and those that will be in 
the future  (Hoffmann, 2013).  
 
In drawing on the ethics conception, this paper notes that while lower income countries have 
contributed less to climate change in terms of emissions, these countries will be disproportionately 
affected by the impacts of climate change as a result of limited levels of adaptive capacity. This is 
particularly true for sub-Saharan Africa which is considered the region most vulnerable to the impacts 
of climate change. It is for this reason that this paper focuses on ACCF to SSA.  
 
Sub-Saharan Africa does not receive the largest portion of climate change financing, despite targeting 
vulnerable countries being a key provision in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC). Based on this incongruity, the central research question is, ‘what are the key 
determining factors for the receipt of adaptation-related climate change financing in sub-Saharan 
African countries?’ while the sub-research question asks to what extent environmental, economic, 
historical, and political factors play a role in determining adaptation-related climate change financing 
flows to sub-Saharan African countries.  
 
In reviewing the literature on climate change financing, this paper summarises pertinent climate 
change negotiations and agreements related to financing. Notable principles established during 
negotiations include the principles of ‘polluter pays’, ‘respective capability’, ‘new and additional’ 
financing, ‘adequate and precautionary’ financing, and ‘predictable’ financing (Schalatek & Bird, 
2014). These principles have proved to be fairly contentious, particularly relating the idea that 
developed countries, with more capability, need to fund developing countries, with more need, despite 
emerging economies such as China and Mexico increasing their emissions considerably. 
 
In reviewing literature on the determinants of climate change financing, this paper finds that much of 
the work has been concentrated on dichotomous ideas of donor interest and recipient need. In seeking 
to expand on this, this paper draws on the work of Clist (2011) which aims to look passed this 
dichotomy, highlighting the role of the relationship between donors and recipients. In doing so Clist 
highlights the importance of the ‘4Ps’, poverty, population, policy and proximity. Clist’s ‘4P’ 
framework is used as the basis for methodology and analysis in this paper. In doing so however the 
‘4P’ model is amended to include vulnerability measures. Drawing on Clist (2011), this paper uses an 
ordinary least squares (OLS), multivariate regression for the allocation of ACCF from seven key 
donors to SSA. 
 
This paper finds that, of the variables considered in the amended 4P model, language, an existing aid 
relationship (both proximity variables) and policy are important determinants for ACCF allocation. 
This paper finds there to be an unexpectedly negative, but significant relationship between ACCF and 
language indicating that donors are more likely to provide ACCF to countries that they do not share a 
language with. The paper finds there to be a positive relationship between ACCF and both an existing 
aid relationship and policy. This indicates that ACCF is more likely to go to countries where the 
recipient and donor have an existing aid relationship and where the recipient country has democratic 
characteristics.  
 
A key concern raised in assessing these findings is that donors appear to be approaching ACCF in the 
same manner that development aid is approached irrespective of potential flaws in development aid 
allocation practices. An additional concern worth noting is that the amended 4P model explains slightly 
less than a quarter of the variance in ACCF. Further research is therefore required to assess the strength 
of the model when, for example, applied to an expanded set of countries. 
 
This paper concludes by highlighting the need for the inclusion of aid effectiveness principles into 
ACCF allocation practices, particularly those of ownership, mutual accountability and results. 
Furthermore, the paper recommends that at an international governance level, particularly relating to 
UNFCCC, more clearly defined targets and objectives are required to better target ACCF.  Finally, the 
paper advocates that the UNFCCC rethink their principle of ‘new and additional’ financing based on 
the idea that climate change considerations be built into, and targeted along with, development 
considerations.  
Chapter 1 : Introduction 
In seeking to assess the nature of adaptation-related climate change financing (ACCF) in sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA), the first chapter of this paper outlines the context of the discussion, sets out the research 
questions, and reviews the relevant literature on the determining factors for receiving ACCF.  
 
1.1. Context 
Key contextual elements to consider in this discussion are first, the definition of climate change, second 
the causes and consequences of climate change, and third, the current state of climate change financing 
(CCF). These elements are summarised in turn in the paragraphs that follow.  
 
Defining ‘climate change’ is in itself not straight forward. It is however an important task in that the 
definition frames negotiations, debates and research priorities. Hoffman (2013) notes that there are 
three characterisations of climate change, namely a scientific characterisation, a social-political-
economic characterisation and an ethical characterisation. 
 
Scientifically, climate change is defined as “…how increasing greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations 
affect global temperatures, ocean chemistry, and vegetation and the associated impacts that emerge 
from these changes” with carbon dioxide (C02) being amongst the most harmful GHGs (Hoffmann, 
2013:4). O’Brien et al. (2007)  refer to the scientific conception as an ‘outcome’ definition where 
associated research focuses on emission trends, developing climate change scenarios, and seeking to 
find solutions to adaptation challenges. 
 
Drawing on the scientific definition of climate change Figure 1 below shows the level C02 emissions 
between 1960 and 2011, measured in metric tonnes of C02 per capita. This figure shows that there is 
a considerable difference between the emissions of high income countries and those of lower income 
countries. High income countries emitted 7.5 metric tonnes of C02 per capita in 1960 and 11.1 metric 
tonnes per capita in 2011; an improvement from a peak of 12.3 metric tonnes in 1979 (World Bank, 
2015b). Barrett (2014) echoes these findings by noting that since the 1960s the world’s developed 
countries have emitted between 1.6 and 2.7 kilo-tonnes of carbon per capita, while the least developed 
countries have emitted an estimated 115 tonnes of carbon per capita. 
 
The second largest emitters, by income group, have been upper middle income countries, but at less 
than half of the emissions of high income countries. Furthermore the emissions of upper-middle 
income countries are currently largely driven by China. Figure 1 shows that China is, in its own right, 
currently the second largest emitter of C02 in metric tonnes per capita when compared to the other 
country groupings. It is therefore important to acknowledge that there is variation within these country 
groupings. 
 
Given the differences in levels of industrialisation these results are perhaps not surprising. What is 
important to take from the below however, and this forms the basis for CCF, is that lower income 
countries have contributed considerably less to global C02 emissions. 
 
Figure 1: CO2 Emissions, 1960 - 2011, Metric Tonnes per Capita  
 
Source: Graph based on data from World Bank, 2015b 
 
Figure 2 below shows C02 emissions in metric tonnes per capita, but by region. From the below it is 
clear that North America has consistently emitted considerably more C02 in metric tonnes per capita 
than any other region, followed by Central Europe and the Baltics. On the lower end of the spectrum 
sub-Saharan Africa has consistently produced the lowest levels of C02 emissions in metric tonnes per 
capita. It is furthermore estimated that SSA is only responsible for 4% of annual greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions (Barnard et al., 2014). Again, these figures may not be surprising given that sub-Saharan 
African countries are typically at lower levels of development and industrialisation. It is however, as 
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above, important to be aware that some regions have contributed less to C02 emissions, but will, as 
elaborated on below, be disproportionately affected by the impacts of climate change. 
 
Figure 2: C02 Emissions by Region, Metric Tonnes per Capita, 1960 - 2011 
 
Source: Graph based on data from World Bank, 2015b 
 
 
Turning to the social-political-economic perspective of climate change, in this sense conceptualising 
climate change includes considerations for economic development, the materials required for energy 
production, and government, private sector and non-governmental organisation (NGO) interests 
(Hoffmann, 2013). From an ethical perspective, definitions of climate change will seek to include a 
focus on who is most affected by climate change currently, and who will be most affected in the future 
(Hoffmann, 2013). The social-political-economic and ethical conceptions would fall into what O’Brien 
et al. (2007)  refer to as ‘contextual’ definitions in that they take into account political and institutional 
structures, climate variation, and economic and social structures.  
 
While acknowledging the importance of a scientific foundation for any research on climate change, 
this paper will primarily draw on the social-political-economic and ethical considerations of climate 
change. The primary reason for this is that impacts of climate change extend beyond the physical 
aspects of diminishing water supplies, extreme weather, agricultural productivity loss and sea level 
rise (Wheeler, 2011). The physical impacts of climate change tend to be exacerbated by the level of 
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adaptive capacity of a country, defined as “the ability to cope with the impacts of climate change” 
(OECD, 2011: 15). OECD (2011) further notes that the ability of a country to adapt to climate change 
is often linked to its level of development with developing countries typically having less resources 
and capacity to limit the impacts of climate change.  
 
Added to this, and as noted above, developing countries have contributed less to climate change. Figure 
3 below, drawing on the Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN) summarises country 
vulnerability, taking into account physical exposure to climate change as well as adaptive capacity 
(ND-GAIN, 2014c). It is clear from the below that SSA, as a region, is most vulnerable to climate 
change with Somalia, Burundi, Liberia, Chad, Eritrea and Sudan being particularly at risk. The high 
level of vulnerability that the SSA region faces forms the basis of this paper’s decision to focus on 
CCF in SSA.  
 
Figure 3: Country Vulnerability to Climate Change, 2013 
 
   
Least Vulnerable  Most Vulnerable 
 
Source: Map compiled with data from ND-GAIN, 2014c 
 
By 2020 it is estimated that in some SSA countries agricultural yields are expected to decline by 50%; 
and by 2080 there is expected to be an increase of between 5% and 8% of arid and semi-arid area on 
the continent, as a result of climate change (Reid, 2014). This will further add to the developmental 
pressure of a region that has the largest share of under-nourished people, high levels of population 
growth, and a high level of reliance on the agricultural sector for employment, gross domestic product 
(GDP) and sustenance (Muller et al., 2014). Finally while the region as a whole is certainly highly 
vulnerable to climate change, there is a fairly high degree of variability both between countries and 
within countries (Busby et al., 2014). 
 
A key tenement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is that 
CCF be directed to the most vulnerable countries (Nakhooda, et al., 2013). While the UNFCCC 
negotiations will be outlined in more detail in the literature review below, it is at this juncture important 
to note that while vulnerability is central to the UNFCCC CCF process, in practice the world’s most 
vulnerable countries do not appear to be receiving a significant portion of CCF  (Nakhooda, et al., 
2013). The UNFCCC has, furthermore, made calls for a more equal distribution between adaptation-
related climate change (ACCF) and mitigation-related climate change (MCCF)  (Nakhooda, et al., 
2013). 
 
Figure 4 below outlines ACCF and MCCF by region for the period 2010 – 2013, as sourced from the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) data on environmental Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), including ACCF and MCCF (OECD, 2015a). The OECD has tracked 
MCCF since 2002 and ACCF since 2010 (OECD, 2015a). The figure below compares regional receipts 
of CCF since 2010 to facilitate a comparison between ACCF and MCCF flows. Of the total CCF 
between 2010 and 2013, South and Central Asia received the largest portion of CCF, followed by Far 
East Asia and SSA (OECD, 2015a). Given the UNFCCC’s focus on vulnerability, the expectation 
would be that SSA receives the bulk of the financing; which does not seem to be case. 
Figure 4: ACCF and MCCF, by Region, 2010 - 2013, US$ Millions 
 
Source: Graph based on data from OECD, 2015 
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Furthermore Figure 4 above shows that the bulk of financing between 2010 and 2013 was allocated to 
MCCF, for all regions. Globally, Figure 5 below shows that in 2013, ACCF formed only 25.38% of 
total CCF. This finding is supported by Rubbelke (2011) who notes that a possible explanation for this 
is that mitigation is seen to relate to public goods, while adaptation action is seen to create benefits 
that are excludable. Essentially, the former’s effects are non-excludable and non-rivalrous, while the 
latter is restricted to the area of intervention. 
 
Figure 5: Climate Change Financing, by Adaptation and Mitigation, 2002 - 2013 (% of Total) 
 
Source: Graph based on data from OECD, 2015 
 
MCCF was, between 2010 and 2013, made up of 74.58% loans, 25.11% grants and 0.31% equity 
investments (OECD, 2015a). On the other hand, ACCF was comprised of 62.18% grants, 37.32% 
loans and 0.51% equity investments (OECD, 2015a). For SSA specifically ACCF was made up of 
85.81% grants, 13.81% loans, and 0.38% equity investments (OECD, 2015a). Because MCCF is 
largely made up of loans there is likely to be less to investigate in terms of the determining factors for 
receiving loans as they would intuitively be linked to the recipient’s ability to repay the loan. For 
ACCF on the other hand, because a large portion of funding is in the form of grants, more research is 
required in ascertaining the determining factors for its flows. 
 
In summary, this section has defined climate change, noting the importance of including ethical, social, 
political and economic considerations in assessing climate change. It has shown that while SSA has 
historically contributed the least to C02 emissions, the region will be disproportionately affected by 
climate change as a result of low levels of adaptive capacity. This section has highlighted that while 
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SSA is the most vulnerable region, it does not receive the largest share of CCF. Finally, the above has 
noted that there has been a bias towards MCCF, but that ACCF is the chosen CCF flow for this paper 
because while the former is mostly likely determined by a country’s ability to repay loans, the 
determining factors for the latter are considerably less clear.  
 
1.2. Research Questions 
Following on the assertion above that SSA is the most vulnerable region to climate change, but not the 
recipient of the largest portion of ACCF, Figure 6 below plots SSA country-level ACCF inflows from 
OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors in terms of their ND-GAIN vulnerability 
scores. Higher vulnerability scores are indicative for increasing country vulnerability to climate change 
(ND-GAIN, 2014c).  
 
Figure 6: Country ACCF Inflows and Vulnerability, 2010 - 2013 
 
Increasing Vulnerability  
Source: Graph based on data from ND-GAIN, 2014c and OECD, 2015a 
 
Figure 6 appears to support the assertion that the most vulnerable countries do not receive the most 
ACCF. Determining which additional factors are at play in determining the flows of ACCF is the 
purpose of this paper. In line with this, the research questions are as follows.  
 
Research Question: What are the key determining factors for the receipt of adaptation-related 
climate change financing in sub-Saharan African countries?  
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Sub-Research Question: To what extent do environmental, economic, historical, and political 
factors play a role in determining adaptation-related climate change financing flows to sub-Saharan 
African countries?  
 
In seeking to understand the provision of ACCF, the literature review below outlines the state of ACCF 
within climate change negotiations. Thereafter literature related to the determining factors of ACCF 
allocation is reviewed. The extent of this literature is however limited and this paper therefore adds to 
the review by drawing on literature related to ODA allocation. In doing so, the review concludes by 
providing a framework for analysis. 
 
1.3. Brief Overview of Relevant Literature  
In ascertaining the costs of addressing climate change, Diamond and Bruch (2011) note that estimates 
range upwards from US$4 billion per annum up until 2030. UNFCCC, for example, estimates that 
between US$156 billion and US$165 billion will be required for MCCF annually until 2030; while 
McKinsey estimates US$324 billion for the same period (Climate Funds Update, 2015). On the other 
hand, the World Bank estimates that between US$70 billion and US$100 billion will be required for 
ACCF annually between 2010 and 2050 (Climate Funds Update, 2015). While there is consensus that 
CCF is required, who is to provide it and how it is to be provided is the subject of ongoing climate 
change negotiations.  These negotiations are outlined in the paragraphs that follow.  
 
1.3.1. Climate Change Negotiations 
Central to climate change negotiations is the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC was established in 1992 as one 
of the three Rio Conventions which arose from the Rio De Janeiro Earth Summit (OECD, 2011). 
Importantly, the UNFCCC distinguishes between Annex 1 and Non-Annex 1 countries with the former 
largely being developed countries and the latter developing countries. 
 
Figure 7 provides an overview of the meetings, Conference of the Parties (COP) sessions and 
agreements that have occurred since the establishment of UNFCCC. For the purposes of this paper, 
the paragraphs that follow will outline only the agreements that are pertinent to CCF specifically. 
 
Figure 7: Timeline of Climate Change Negotiations 
 
Source: UNFCCC, 2014 
 
A key part of the UNFCCC is a clause that notes that “developed countries shall provide new and 
additional financial resources to developing countries”  (UNFCCC, 2014). In addition, Article 4.3 of 
the UNFCCC highlights that developed countries should provide funding for the “full and incremental 
costs” of climate change in developing countries (Schalatek & Bird, 2014). Finally the UNFCCC 
advocates that climate actions be centred on countries’ “common, but differentiated responsibilities 
and respective capabilities” (CDR) (Schalatek & Bird, 2014). Harvey (2015) notes that in its 
establishment, the provisions of UNFCCC called for action, but that the wording remained fairly 
vague. 
 
COP3 in Kyoto in 1997 was more specific. It was here that a protocol was developed to cut global 
GHG emissions by 5% when compared to 1990 levels (Harvey, 2015). Annex 1 countries were 
furthermore given specific emissions reduction targets, while this specification was not applied to Non-
Annex 1 countries  (Harvey, 2015). This protocol was not however ratified by the United States of 
America (USA)  (Harvey, 2015). For the protocol to have come into force, ratification was required 
by countries’ responsible for, collectively, at least 55% of global emissions  (Harvey, 2015). Without 
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the USA, this target was not met and the protocol did not come into force at the time (Harvey, 2015). 
This however changed in 2004 when Russia ratified the protocol and as a result the 55% target was 
reached  (Harvey, 2015). 
 
The 2007 Bali Action, resulting from COP13 argued that CCF must be ‘adequate, predictable, 
sustainable, new and additional’  (Schalatek & Bird, 2014). COP15 in Copenhagen in 2007 provided 
specific CCF targets, resulting in a commitment to providing US$100 billion per year in additional 
CCF from 2020; and that developed countries would contribute US$30 billion between 2010 and 2012 
in what became known as the ‘fast start finance’ (FSF) period (Grantham Research Institute, 2013). 
COP13 furthermore resulted in an agreement for all developed countries and the larger developing 
countries to reduce their emissions  (Harvey, 2015). While not legally binding, this was ratified at 
COP14 in Cancun in 2010  (Harvey, 2015). The 2010 Cancun Agreements further stipulated that 
polluter countries would need to contribute to CCF based on historical and current GHG emissions, 
commonly known as the ‘polluter pays’ principle  (Schalatek & Bird, 2014).  
 
In summary, a number of key principles were established through the frameworks and negotiations 
outlined above. These principles include the principles of ‘polluter pays’, ‘respective capability’, ‘new 
and additional’, ‘adequate and precautionary’, and ‘predictable’ (Schalatek & Bird, 2014). As noted 
‘polluter pays’ refers to countries with higher levels of GHG emissions funding climate change efforts; 
‘respective capability’ refers to the idea that countries should provide CCF based on their means; and 
‘new and additional’ highlights that CCF should be separate from ODA (Schalatek & Bird, 2014). 
‘Adequate and precautionary’ emphasises that CCF be sufficient to slow global temperature increases; 
and lastly, ‘predictability’ refers to better planning in medium term funding cycles (Schalatek & Bird, 
2014). 
 
The arguments underlying these clauses are arguments of responsibility, justice and ethics. Fussel 
(2010) argues that vulnerability is a function of capability while the provision of finance is a function 
of responsibility. Fussel (2010) goes onto say that, as noted in the sections above, developing countries 
are more vulnerable because they have lower levels of adaptive capacity; while for higher income 
countries the inverse is true. The responsibility for CCF would then be with developed countries, 
having disproportionately contributed to the problem (Fussel, 2010). Adding to this argument, Grasso 
(2010) argues that developed countries are ethically responsible for the provision of climate change 
financing.  
 
The principles outlined above are fairly contentious in climate change negotiations. A considerable 
sticking point is the view that the world has changed considerably since the establishment of UNFCCC 
in terms of who the world’s largest emitters of GHG are and the rising negotiating power of emerging 
economies (Gomez-Echeverri, 2013). Cooper (2012) for example notes that by 2020 developing 
countries will emit more carbon dioxide than the world’s total GHG emissions in 1990. Some critics 
argue that developing countries have contributed to climate change through overgrazing and 
deforestation and are therefore also partly responsible  (Latin, 2011). Furthermore, the argument has 
been made that being solely responsible for CCF is politically unfeasible in terms of citizen buy-in  
(Latin, 2011). 
 
In addition to criticism along developed / developing country lines, the UNFCCC has also been 
criticised from a technical perspective. Brunner and Enting (2014) for example note that the UNFCCC 
has not set mid-term financing targets, nor signified an end period for finance requirements. As a result 
CCF is not predictable from a recipient perspective (Brunner & Enting, 2014). Furthermore, UNFCCC 
processes have defined monetary input, but have not defined specific outputs or outcomes, nor outlined 
monitoring and evaluation activities (Brunner & Enting, 2014). 
 
Finally, a key criticism and a key consideration when assessing CCF is that there is uncertainty about 
what exactly is considered CCF (Grantham Research Institute, 2013). This has implications for 
tracking CCF. In addition, as a result of there being a high degree of overlap between the development 
and climate change fields, donors have in some instances reclassified portions of their ODA to meet 
CCF objectives (Grantham Research Institute, 2013).  
 
Bearing these caveats in mind, the section that follows provides an overview of the aid and CCF 
allocation literature, beginning with a review of the FSF period. 
 
1.4. Determining Factors in ACCF Allocation 
In reviewing the determining factors for ACCF, this paper, as noted above draws on work related to 
ODA allocation. In addition to this being a result of the limited nature of allocation literature that 
relates directly to CCF, this paper argues that ODA and ACCF allocations are analogous. In this paper, 
for example, ACCF data is retrieved from the OECD where it is defined as climate-related ODA. 
ACCF is therefore, in this paper, related to ODA in that it is reported as a component of ODA. 
Furthermore, the ACCF and ODA commitments follow similar patterns in that the majority of 
commitments are in the form of grants (OECD, 2015 and OECD QWIDS, 2015). For example, based 
on calculations using OECD (2015) and OECD QWIDS (2015), of the ACCF flows into sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) 58.06% were grants and similarly, but on a larger scale, of the ODA flows into SSA, 
grants formed 79.10% of total commitments. Furthermore both ODA and ACCF commitments 
typically flow from higher income countries to lower income countries. 
 
1.4.1. The Fast Start Finance Period 
A helpful starting point for assessing the determinants of ACCF allocation is the literature that was 
produced after the UNFCCC’s FSF period which, as noted above, ran from 2010 to 2012. Between 
2010 and 2012, donors exceeded the US$30 billion target, raising US$34 billion (Nakhooda, et al., 
2013). While by no means extensive, some work has been done on key outcomes of this period. 
Nakhooda et al. (2013) found that while funding increased, some donors were reassigning existing 
projects to climate change projects, going against the UNFCCC’s ‘new and additional’ CCF 
requirement. This claim is supported by OXFAM (2012) who estimates that only 33% of the funds 
allocated could be considered ‘new and additional’. 
 
Furthermore, during this period the bulk of the funding went to lower middle income countries, 
followed by high income countries, upper middle income countries and lastly, by low income countries 
(Nakhooda, et al., 2013). This implies that the most vulnerable countries were not targeted. Nakhooda 
et al. (2013) explain this by noting that the flow of FSF is related to the strength of recipient country 
institutions with higher income countries arguably having better institutions and overall levels of 
development. In other words, these countries are better able to manage the funds. While this may 
indeed be the case, a key tenement of the UNFCCC is that financing be provided to the most vulnerable 
countries which has not, as noted, been the case in the fast start finance period (Nakhooda, et al., 2013). 
 
To provide additional insight into the determining factors of ACCF, the section that follows includes 
a review of ODA literature. First this review will look at allocation literature that considers donor 
interest and recipient need. Thereafter the review draws on the work of Paul Clist (2011) in outlining 
a model that attempts to move beyond the dichotomy of donor interest and recipient need, by 
emphasising the existing relationship between donor and recipient. 
 
1.4.2. Allocation Literature: Donor Interest and Characteristics 
i. Donor Interest  
The body of work on donor interest is considerable. The paragraphs that follow aim to outline this 
work as succinctly as possible. Work done by Hoeffler and Outram on ODA (2011) and by Lewis 
(2003) on environmental aid both highlight that donor interest is key to ODA and environmental aid 
flows in that donors typically provide more aid to recipients where they have a commercial interest. It 
is however also noted that there is variation within donors and that for example, Germany does not 
tend to follow the trend of assisting their larger trade partners (Hoeffler & Outram, 2011). Conversely 
to Germany, Lewis (2003) specifically looks at the environmental aid practices of the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and notes that through the agency, the USA is more 
likely to fund countries with rich natural resources and countries that are democratic. From this, donor 
interests abroad appear to be key, rather than donor characteristics at home. 
 
In ‘Determinants of Donor Generosity: A Survey of the Aid Budget Literature’. Fuchs et al. (2014) 
zero in on the prevailing conditions in donor countries that will affect ODA flows. Through their 
research Fuchs et al. (2014) find that aid budgets tend to increase with increased donor country wealth, 
arguing that higher levels of donor income make ODA more palatable to donor country taxpayers. 
Furthermore Fuchs et al. (2014) find there to be a positive relationship between the flow of ODA and 
whether the donor country has an independent aid agency. In addition, Fuchs et al. (2014) find that 
donor country aid effort does not, as hypothesised, decrease as population size decreases; that ‘peer 
pressure’ in the form of other donors’ activities does not increase the likelihood of a donor providing 
ODA; higher donor-country social spending is not positively correlated with higher aid flows; and 
finally, a donor country’s macroeconomic conditions do not have an effect on aid flows. 
 
ii. Recipient Characteristics 
Consensus around recipient need appears to be that it does not rank highly as a determining factor for 
the receipt of aid. Nakhooda et al. (2013) echo this in their review of the FSF period by noting that 
FSF was not highly correlated with GHG emissions or recipient vulnerability to climate change. In a 
study looking at the intra-national flows of CCF in Malawi, Barrett (2014) finds that vulnerability is 
not a determining factor. Barrett (2014) notes that instead, it is possible that CCF goes to higher income 
areas that are better able to operationalise the funding; or indeed that it goes to areas where agriculture 
is important. Therefore Barrett (2014) finds that even if donors direct funds to more vulnerable 
countries, there are no guarantees that these funds will filter down into the neediest areas of the country. 
Adding to this, research by Fuchs et al. (2014) illustrates that aid budgets do not increase based on 
recipient need. 
 
Another area where research has been conducted is that of recipient merit. Hoeffler and Outram (2011) 
for example, look at the activities of five key donors. In doing so they find that donors do not tend to 
base their aid decisions on recipient merit overall, but that there are different areas that are more 
important for different donors (Hoeffler & Outram, 2011). In this sense Hoeffler and Outram (2011) 
take merit to mean countries with higher growth, better democracy scores and lower human rights 
abuses (Hoeffler & Outram, 2011). In terms of individual donor behaviour, Hoeffler and Outram 
(2011) note that the UK appears to favour democratic countries with sound economic policies, while 
France, Germany and Japan tend to favour countries with better human rights, and the US tends to 
give more aid to countries with lower levels of human rights (Hoeffler & Outram, 2011). 
 
1.4.3. The Relationship between Donors and Recipients: The 4P Framework 
As noted above, little research has been published on the determinants of receiving CCF in general, or 
ACCF specifically. In seeking a framework for method and analysis therefore, it was not possible to 
use a paper specifically relating to ACCF. This research therefore draws on work related to the 
determinants of ODA flows. In doing so the work of Paul Clist (2011) entitled “25 Years of Aid 
Allocation: Whither Selectivity” is used.  
 
This paper is selected as a framework because it departs from the more rigid discourse of ‘donor 
interest’ and ‘recipient need’ in ascertaining the determinants of ODA commitments (Clist, 2011). 
Clist (2011) notes that the donor interest and recipient need rhetoric implies that these facets are 
mutually exclusive. Instead Clist (2011) adopts a more nuanced, and arguably more realistic approach, 
namely the ‘4Ps’ – poverty, population, policy and proximity. While poverty, population and policy 
are looked at in terms of the recipient country, the proximity variable aims to focus more on the 
relationship that exists between the donor and the recipient (Clist, 2011). In doing so the proximity 
variable looks at trade between the donor and recipient; the distance between the donor and the 
recipient; whether the recipient was ever colonised by the donor; and whether the donor and recipient 
share a common language and religion (Clist, 2011).  Fuchs et al. (2014) add this by noting that while 
a historical relationship would be expected to coincide with more aid, they have in fact found that in 
some instances aid is a substitute for colonial histories where donors overcompensate in countries that 
they do not have an existing relationship with.  
 In line with this focus on the relationship between donor and recipient, Barrett (2014) finds that within 
Malawi more climate aid goes to districts with an established aid network. Therefore an existing aid 
relationship could add to Clist’s (2011) summary factors outlined above. Hoeffler and Outram (2011) 
add to this by noting that favourites in aid allocation will continue receiving more aid. This is 
particularly important for the US, Germany and France (Hoeffler & Outram, 2011).  
 
Details on the method used by Clist (2011) as well as the operationalisation of the ‘4P’ framework for 
ACCF are provided in the methodology chapter that follows. 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter 2 : Methodology 
2.1. Application of the ‘4P’ Framework for ACCF 
In order to research which of the ‘4Ps’ are key elements in ascertaining ODA flows, Clist (2011) makes 
use of the ‘Two-Part’ or ‘Cragg’ model where the first regression (a probit regression) determines 
which recipients receive ODA and the second regression (a linear regression) seeks to determine how 
much ODA these recipients receive (Clist, 2011). This decision is made in order to ensure that the 
betas are not biased towards zero by recipients that do not receive any ODA (Clist, 2011).  Clist’s 
(2011) model is estimated by the donor and outlined in the equation below.  
 
Equation 1: Clist’s 4P Regression Model 
…………………… 𝐴𝑖 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
In operationalising the ‘4P’ framework for ACCF, a few changes are made to the selection of 
indicators. A key change made, for example, is that climate change vulnerability is included as an 
indicator of recipient need vis-à-vis adaptation to climate change. Clist’s (2011) overall model is 
therefore amended slightly, as reflected in the equation below.  
 
Equation 2: Amended 4P Regression Model 
𝐶𝑖 =  𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑦𝑖 + 𝛽5𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖 
 
In addition to changes in indicators this paper departs slightly from Clist in terms of methodology. A 
key departure from Clist’s framework is that this paper is interested in a broader view on the variables 
that best explain ACCF flows. Therefore rather than looking at which variables are important to 
specific donors as Clist (2011) does, this paper looks at which variables are more generally meaningful. 
This decision is made in line with the research questions. 
 
Furthermore, instead of the ‘two-part model’ which is noted above, this paper makes use of an 
‘Ordinary Least Squares’ multivariate regression, aggregating 4-year data into a single observation for 
each donor-recipient combination. In seeking to address the possibility that the betas will be biased 
towards zero as a result of some recipients not receiving any ACCF, this paper ran two Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regressions; one where recipients that received no funding were included and one 
where they were not. In doing so it was found that both regressions produced the same results, 
indicating that including recipients that receive no ACCF does not bias the betas towards zero.  
 
Finally, this paper acknowledges that a time series regression would likely have produced more 
insightful results. The decision against using a time series regression was based on the fact that a 
number of explanatory variables included in the model did not vary in the period under consideration. 
Specifically, vulnerability, language, distance, religion and colony did not vary.  
 
While this section serves to provide an overview of the approach used by Clist and the approach used 
in this paper, the paragraphs that follow outline the use of the specific variables in the model, in turn.  
 
2.1.1. Data 
i. Time 
Clist (2011) constructs 5 year averages using 25-year data. This approach is made possible due to the 
fact that ODA has been tracked for considerably longer than ACCF. The bilateral adaptation-related 
climate change financing (ACCF) data in this paper are, as mentioned in the section above, sourced 
from the OECD DAC’s climate-related aid (CRA) statistics (OECD, 2015a). The OECD (2015) has 
been tracking ACCF since 2010, with data being available until 2013. For the dependent variable then, 
the period 2010 – 2013 is used. For the independent variables however data is included from 2009 
with the view that these variables are lagged for the regression (Hout, 2007). This is based on the idea 
that donors will make their decisions based on the previous year’s indicators. This choice signifies 
another departure from the methodology used in Clist (2011). 
 
ii. Selection of Donors 
Clist (2011) does not consider all donors in the model, but rather focuses on seven key donors namely 
France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom (UK) and United States of America 
(USA). Clist (2011) justifies this decision by noting that these donors provide 67% of the world’s 
ODA. Clist (2011) further notes that Sweden was included to represent Nordic donors, but does not 
provide further explanation for this decision.  
 
In applying the ‘4P’ framework, this paper follows Clist in selecting the afore-mentioned seven donors. 
A slight departure however is that Canada is included as a donor instead of the USA. This decision 
was made because in the period under consideration the USA did not provide any ACCF to SSA. 
Furthermore, while Canada is typically considered a more altruistic donor than the USA, the countries 
share the same proximity characteristics; neither have colonised any country in SSA, they share the 
same dominant religion, and they are at similar distances from SSA (Brown et al., 2015, ARDA, 2015, 
and Mayer & Zignango, 2011). 
 
Similarly to ODA, these seven donors (including Canada) provided the bulk of ACCF to SSA between 
2010 and 2013. OECD (2015) data shows that Canada, France, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden 
and UK provided 75.03% of ACCF commitments to SSA between 2010 and 2013. Of the seven donors, 
France’s contribution of 31.89% was the highest, followed by Japan at 22.87%. Germany at 8.22%, 
UK at 3.86%, Sweden at 3.80%, Netherlands at 2.39%, and Canada at 1.99% (OECD, 2015a). 
 
iii. Selection of Recipients 
Clist (2011) focuses on all recipient countries in the first round regression, and only on recipients that 
received ODA in the periods under consideration in the second round. This paper, on the other hand, 
looks at the 48 countries of SSA. The introduction and literature review of this paper note that SSA is 
selected as the region of interest because of its high level of vulnerability to climate change, combined 
with an overall lower adaptive capacity. The selection of the 48 countries is based on the World Bank’s 
regional classifications (World Bank, 2015a).  
 
iv. The Dependent Variable 
Clist (2011) draws on OECD ODA data as a logged percentage of the donor’s total ODA budget to a 
given recipient in a given year. This indicator is logged to normalise the distribution. Furthermore, 
Clist (2011) notes the figure represents commitments rather than disbursements as the former is put 
forward as a better proxy for donor intentions.  
 
In focusing on ACCF rather than ODA, this paper draws on the OECD’s data on climate-related aid, 
also known as the OECD’s ‘Rio Markers’ (OECD, 2015a). OECD data is selected on the basis that it 
is the most comprehensive ACCF data available. The Rio Markers are named after the three 
conventions that came out of the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil (OECD, 2011). These 
conventions relate to biological diversity, desertification, and climate change (OECD, 2011). The 
OECD tracks all three conventions, but for the purposes of this paper only data related to the 
adaptation-related climate change activities is considered; where an adaptation-related activity is 
defined as an activity that “…intends to reduce the vulnerability of human or natural systems to the 
impacts of climate change and climate-related risks, by maintaining or increasing adaptive capacity 
and resilience. This encompasses a range of activities from information and knowledge generation, to 
capacity development, planning and the implementation of climate change adaptation actions.” 
(OECD, 2011:4).  
 
In tracking ACCF OECD (2011) assigns a score of ‘0’, ‘1’, or ‘2’ to the project. Here, ‘0’ refers to 
adaptation not being targeted, ‘1’ refers to adaptation being a significant objective, and ‘2’ refers to 
adaptation being a ‘principle objective’. OECD (2011) further notes that where fields are left blank, 
no data is available. For the purposes of this paper only projects where adaptation is a principle 
objective are considered1. The rationale behind this is that because these projects would not have gone 
ahead without the adaptation element, they are a better reflection of donor behaviours towards ACCF. 
It is important to note that this decision has a considerable impact on the number of data points that 
can be analysed. Table 1 below shows that only looking at principle objectives reduces the number of 
projects to 1,217 and the total value to US$2.5 billion (OECD, 2015). This is further reduced by this 
paper only considering seven donors. Here the number falls to 632 and the value to US$1.9 billion. 
The limited size of the data must be kept in mind when interpreting the results of this paper. While this 
decision limits the size of the data set, the focus on principle objective will provide a more realistic 
model. 
 
Table 1: Adaptation-Related Projects, by Objective, 2010 – 2013 (Total) 
Objectives 
All Donors Seven Donors 
No. of Projects Value of Projects No. of Projects Value of Projects 
Principle Objective 1,217 US$2.5 billion 632 US$1.9 billion 
Significant Objective 3,996 US$5.8 billion 1,526 US$2.9 billion 
Not Targeted 9,435 US$12.8 billion 4,437 US$7.3 billion 
Total 14,648 US$21.1 billion 6,595 US$12.1 billion 
Source: Calculations based on OECD, 2015 
 
In addition the afore-mentioned limitations, Nakhooda et al. (2013) note that Rio Marker data is not 
always consistent across donors as a result of differing reporting practices. The Rio Markers are 
nevertheless used in this paper because they provide the most comprehensive ACCF data. 
 
                                                 
1 At the SSA level there were originally 18,689 projects (US$23.675). For adaptation, 4,041 of these were blank; 9,435 noted that adaptation was not 
targeted; 3,996 noted that adaptation was a significant objective, and 1,217 were a principle objective.  
The ACCF variable used in this analysis is summarized in Table 2 below and represents the value of 
ACCF flows from each donor to each recipient, aggregated using data from 2010, 2011, 2012 and 
2013. ACCF data is logged in order to normalise the distribution. 
 
Table 2: ACCF Variable, Summarised 
Variable Form Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ACCF 
 
Untransformed 336 1.419 6.350 0 85.122 
Logged 139 -0.441 2.550 -10.819 4.386 
Source: Calculations based on data from OECD (2015)  
 
v. Independent Variables 
 
Poverty and Vulnerability 
Turning to the independent variables, Clist (2011) uses logged GDP per capita to represent poverty 
and sources the data from the World Bank2. Clist (2011) notes that the indicator is logged to normalise 
distribution and that the indicator is selected because while it may not be the best indicator for poverty 
it is the most comprehensive and arguably the most widely used.  Finally, poverty is included as a 
representation of recipient need where it is expected that higher levels of poverty will result in more 
ODA  (Clist, 2011). 
 
Table 3 below summarizes the GDP per capita (poverty) variable in the ACCF model. This paper 
includes poverty, using the same measures as Clist, in its model. However, rather than representing 
recipient need, GDP per capita is taken to be indicative of adaptive capacity which is defined as “…the 
ability to cope with the impacts of climate change. In many cases a country’s ability to cope is related 
to its level of development. Generally, the more developed a country is, the more resources it has at its 
disposal with which to adapt to climate change; this includes financial, technical and human resources 
(OECD, 2011: 15).  
 
Table 3: Poverty Variable, Summarised 
Variable Form Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Poverty  
 
Untransformed 322 1,834.286 3,006.023 151.527 13,446.650 
Logged 322 6.712 1.138 5.021 9.503 
Source: OECD, 2015 
                                                 
2 Defined as: “GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by mid-year population. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current US Dollars. (World Bank, 2015b). 
 In line with the literature on climate change financing policies, it is expected that countries with lower 
adaptive capacities would receive more ACCF. Therefore a decrease in GDP per capita is expected to 
result in an increase in ACCF as shown in the hypothesis 1A below.  
 
Equation 3: Hypothesis 1A, GDP per Capita (Adaptive Capacity) 
…………………………………………………………………………………….. 𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻1𝐴 < 0 
In addition to GDP per capita, this paper includes vulnerability as a measure of recipient need, as 
summarized in Table 4 below. The indicator used to represent exposure is the ND GAIN (2014a) 
exposure score. The ND GAIN index is an overall score that combines the vulnerability and readiness 
indices (ND-GAIN, 2014a). The vulnerability index is composed of sensitivity scores, exposure scores 
and adaptive capacity scores which are based on indicators related to food, water, health, ecosystems 
services, human habitat and infrastructure3 (ND-GAIN, 2014a).  
 
On the other hand, the readiness index looks at economic, governance and social issues (ND-GAIN, 
2014a). Of the many variables that ND GAIN publishes the exposure variable is the most appropriate 
to this research in that it is the only vulnerability variable that is isolated, “the degree to which a system 
is exposed to significant climate change from a biophysical experience. It is a component of 
vulnerability independent of socio economic context. Exposure indicators are projected impacts for 
the coming decades and are therefore invariant overtime in ND-GAIN” (ND-GAIN, 2014a). The 
nature of the exposure variable is therefore less likely to correlate with other variables in the model. 
 
Table 4: Vulnerability Variable, Summarised 
Variable Form Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Exposure Untransformed 329 0.544 0.055 0.462 0.693 
Source: Calculations based on data from OECD (2015) 
                                                 
3 Food indicators u used for exposure: “projected change in agricultural cereal yield” and “projected population growth”  (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Food 
indicators used for sensitivity: “food import dependency” and “rural population”  (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Food indicators used for capacity: “agricultural 
capacity (fertiliser, irrigation, pesticide, tractor use)” and “child malnutrition” (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Water indicators used for exposure: “projected change 
in annual groundwater runoff” and “projected change of annual groundwater recharge”  (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Water indicators used for sensitivity: “fresh 
water withdrawal rate” and “water dependency ratio”  (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Water indicators used for capacity: “access to reliable drinking water” and 
“dam capacity” (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Health indicators used for exposure: “projected change of malaria hazard” and “projected change in deaths from 
climate change induced diseases”  (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Health indicators used for sensitivity: “slum population” and “dependency on external resources 
for health services”  (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Health Indicators used for capacity: “medical staff (physicians, nurses and midwives)” and “access to improved 
sanitation facilities” (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Ecosystem Service indicators used for exposure: “projected change of biome distribution” and “projected change 
in marine biodiversity”  (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Ecosystem Service indicators used for sensitivity: “dependency on natural capital” and “ecological footprint”  
(ND-GAIN, 2014a). Ecosystem Service indicators used for capacity: “projected biomes” and “engagement in international environmental conventions” 
(ND-GAIN, 2014a). Human Habitat indicators used for exposure: “projected change of heatwave hazard” and “projected change of flood hazard”  (ND-
GAIN, 2014a). Human Habitat indicators used for sensitivity: “urban concentration” and “age dependency ratio”  (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Human Habitat 
indicators used for capacity: “quality of trade and transport related infrastructure” and “paved roads” (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Infrastructure indicators used 
for exposure: “projected change of hydropower generation capacity” and “projection of sea level rise impacts”  (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Infrastructure 
indicators used for sensitivity: “dependency on imported energy” and “population living under 5m sea level”  (ND-GAIN, 2014a). Infrastructure indicators 
used for capacity: “electricity access” and “disaster preparedness” (ND-GAIN, 2014a). 
 In line with climate change policies and treaties it is expected that higher levels of exposure will elicit 
higher levels of ACCF. In ND GAIN’s exposure score, countries with higher scores are considered 
more vulnerable. Therefore increases in exposure are expected to result in increases in ACCF as 
outlined in hypothesis 1B below.  
 
Equation 4: Hypothesis 1B, Exposure (Vulnerability) 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻1𝐵 > 0 
 
It is important to note that in addition to ND GAIN, other climate change indicators include German 
Watch’s “Climate Risk Index” and David Wheeler’s “Climate Change Vulnerability Index”. The 
“Climate Risk Index” looks at the magnitude of losses related to extreme weather (German Watch, 
2015a). Wheeler (2011) on the other hand, looks at climate drivers which are disaggregated into 
extreme weather, sea level rise and agricultural productivity loss. Of these, ND GAIN was ultimately 
selected over the “Cimate Risk Index” because it is more detailed and it allows the option of isolating 
exposure from other factors. Turning to Wheeler, ND GAIN was considered preferable because while 
both provide disaggregated data ND-GAIN represents 15 years’ of data while Wheeler is limited to 1 
year, 2010. 
 
Population 
Clist (2011) logs total population figures to normalise the distribution of the indicator. Clist (2011) 
furthermore notes that population is included as an additional variable to GDP per capita in order to 
check whether there is a bias in the model towards countries with bigger populations such as China 
and India. This bias is expected because countries with larger populations have lower levels of 
development, Clist (2011) therefore hypothesises that larger populations will receive more ODA. 
 
Like Clist, this paper uses logged total population figures from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators4, as summarised in Table 5 below (World Bank, 2015b).  
Table 5: Population Variable, Summarised 
Variable Form Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Population 
 
Untransformed 336 18,515,341.421 2.75e+07 88,203 164,346,169.200 
Logged 336 15.800 1.569 11.387 18.903 
                                                 
4 Where population is defined as: “Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents regardless of legal status 
or citizenship – except for refugees not permanently settled in the country of asylum, who are generally considered part of the population of their country 
of origin. The values shown are midyear estimates.” (World Bank, 2015b) 
Source: Calculations based on data from World Bank (2015b) 
 
Drawing on the argument outlined by Clist which is noted above, it is expected that countries in sub-
Saharan Africa with larger populations will receive more ACCF. Hypothesis 2 therefore notes that the 
relationship between population and ACCF will be greater than zero, as outlined below.  
 
Equation 5: Hypothesis 2, Population 
………………………………………………………………………………………. 𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻2 > 0 
 
Policy 
Policy is considered an important variable in that it is seen as “… the ability of a recipient to turn a 
given amount of aid into a desirable outcome in the mind of the donor” (Clist, 2011: 1725). In order 
to represent policy, Clist (2011) focuses on indicators related to governance and institutions and 
therefore uses the Freedom House Freedom Index and the Political Terror Scale (PTS). Clist (2011) 
claims that improvements in the Freedom Index and PTS will result in more ODA.  
 
In applying Clist’s framework this paper includes policy as a variable, but changes the indicators used 
to represent it. First, this paper excludes PTS as this is seen as more relevant to the USA which is 
excluded from this model for the afore-mentioned reasons. Second, the Freedom Index is replaced by 
the Polity IV overall Polity2 score. The argument made in favour of using Polity IV over Freedom 
House is that the latter index emphasises elements most closely related to a ‘western’ liberal democracy 
which may not give a realistic view of governance and institutions in countries that do not fit this 
model (Norris, 2003). This is not to say that Polity IV is not without its limitations, but rather that in 
this context it is considered a more realistic indicator.   
 
Polity IV’s Polity2 score is composed of its ‘democracy’ and ‘autocracy’ scores where the emphasis 
is political participation of the citizenry, constraints on the chief executive and the competitiveness of 
executive recruitment (Marshall et al., 2013). A higher score is taken to mean higher levels of 
democracy (Marshall et al., 2013). The Polity2 indictor is summarised in the table below. 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Policy Variable, Summarised 
Variable Form Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Policy Untransformed 322 2.233437 4.983847 -9 10 
Source: Calculations based on data from OECD, 2015a 
 
In line with the idea that there is enhanced policy selectivity amongst donors, it is expected that a 
higher Polity2 score will result in more ACCF (Clist, 2011). Hypothesis 3, below, therefore shows that 
the relationship between policy and ACCF will be positive.  
 
Equation 6: Hypothesis 3, Policy (Polity2) 
…………………………………………………………….………………………… 𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻3 > 0 
 
Proximity 
Clist (2011) includes this variable by arguing that proximity factors potentially enhance efficiency in 
that closer proximity indicates lower cultural and language barriers. Specifically, in constructing a 
proximity index, Clist (2011) initially includes distance, religion, colony and language. Through initial 
regressions distance is excluded from the index because it showed a negative relationship while the 
remaining indicators showed positive relationships (Clist, 2011). Furthermore trade, in the form of 
general exports and arms exports is not included in the proximity index because as Clist (2011) notes, 
its relationship to ODA is unpredictable. Overall Clist (2011) argues that the relationship between 
proximity variables and ODA is expected to be positive.  
 
In determining the relationship of the proximity variables to ACCF, this paper takes a slight departure 
from Clist (2011) by not constructing a proximity index. Instead, in order to ascertain the explanatory 
power of each variable, the proximity variables are listed separately. Furthermore instead of looking 
at donor exports to recipients, this paper takes the viewpoint of the recipient and therefore analyses 
recipient imports from donors. Finally, an additional variable is added to the proximity namely ODA 
per capita. The purpose of this variable is ascertain whether, in providing ACCF, donors fund countries 
that they are already giving ODA to. The proximity variables used in attempting to explain ACCF 
variance are summarised in Table 7 below and considered in more detail in the paragraphs that follow. 
 
 
Table 7: Proximity Variables, Summarised 
Variable Form Obs.  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Distance Untransformed 336 7.886 3.025 3.795 15.270 
Religion Untransformed 336 Dummy Dummy 0 1 
Colony Untransformed 336 Dummy Dummy 0 1 
Language Untransformed 336 Dummy Dummy 0 1 
ODA 
 
Untransformed 336 4.167 12.526 -0.004 147.982 
Logged 316 0.092 1.862 -7.402 4.997 
Imports 
 
Untransformed 329 2.589 3.848 0 30.410 
Logged 328 .173 1.367 -6.093 3.417 
Source: Calculations based on data from ARDA, 2015, Mayer & Zignago, 2011, UNCTAD, 2015, OECD QWIDS, 2015, and Joshua 
Project, 2015 (ARDA, 2015) 
 
In constructing data for the distance indicator, this paper, like Clist (2011), draws on the work done by 
Mayer and Zignago (2011) for CEPII5. The distance variable represents the distance between the donor 
and recipient and where 1,000km is equal to one unit (Clist, 2011). Furthermore, CEPII data does not 
include South Sudan, but given the location and shared history with Sudan, Sudan data is used as a 
proxy for South Sudan. In line with Clist’s (2011) note that closer proximity is likely to improve 
efficiency gains, it is expected that closer countries will receive more ACCF. Hypothesis 4A below 
notes that there will be a negative relationship between ACCF and distance because, as noted, less 
distance implies a closer relationship. 
 
Equation 7: Hypothesis 4A, Distance 
…………………………………………………………….……………………… 𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻4𝐴 < 0 
 
As with Clist (2011) the colony variable was sourced from CEPII where it is reported as a dummy 
variable where ‘1’ represents a historical colonial relationship between donor and recipient, and ‘0’ 
represents no colonial history (Mayer & Zignago, 2011). Again, Sudan is used as a proxy for South 
Sudan and a closer relationship is expected to increase ACCF (Clist, 2011). In line with this, 
Hypothesis 4B shows that the relationship between ACCF and colony is expected to be positive. 
 
Equation 8: Hypothesis 4B, Colony 
…………………………………………………………….……………………… 𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻4𝐵 > 0 
 
Similarly the language indicator is a dummy where ‘1’ denotes that the donor and recipient share an 
official language and ‘0’ denotes that they do not (Mayer & Zignago, 2011)6. Here, a slight departure 
is that while Clist (2011) considers the percentage of people in the donor and recipient countries that 
speak the same language where ‘1’ indicates that at least 9% of the recipient and donor populations 
                                                 
5 CEPII uses the great circle distance formula to calculate distance between countries (Mayer & Zignago, 2011). 
6 CEPII is used for all countries except for South Sudan where the source is the Joshua Project (Joshua Project, 2015). 
speak the same language. This paper elects to look at official languages as a clearer indicator of 
historical ties. As with the other proximity variables, a closer relationship is expected to elicit higher 
ACCF. Hypothesis 4C below therefore shows that a positive relationship between ACCF and language 
is expected. 
 
Equation 9: Hypothesis 4C, Language 
………………………………………………………….………………………… 𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻4𝐶 > 0 
 
Turning to religion, this variable was constructed based on data from ARDA (2015) where a score of 
‘1’ was allocated if donor and recipient shared a major religion7 8. As above, here closer proximity 
through shared religion is expected to have a positive relationship with ACCF (Clist, 2011). This 
expectation of a positive relationship is summarised in Hypothesis 4D below. 
 
Equation 10: Hypothesis 4D, Religion 
…………………………………………………………….……………………… 𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻4𝐷 > 0 
 
The trade variable is taken to be the share of total imports that a recipient receives from a donor and 
this is calculated based on UNCTAD (2015) data. In order to normalise the distribution, this data is 
logged. As above, it is expected that a closer trade relationship will have a positive effect on ACCF. 
This expectation is outlined in Hypothesis 4E below which shows that a positive relationship is 
expected. 
 
Equation 11: Hypothesis 4E, Imports 
…………………………………………………………….……………………… 𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻4𝐸 > 0 
 
Finally, ODA data was sourced from OECD QWIDS (2015) and divided by the recipient country’s 
population to calculate ODA per capita. In order to normalise the distribution, ODA per capita was 
logged. It is expected that the greater the existing ODA relationship between donor and recipient, the 
greater ACCF will be. Therefore a positive relationship is expected, as summarised in Hypothesis 4F 
below.  
                                                 
7 In this paper, a religion is considered widespread in a country where more than 30% of the population follows the religion in question.  
8 A different source was used for South Sudan, namely the Joshua Project (2015) 
 Equation 12:  Hypothesis 4F, ODA per Capita 
……………………………………………………………………………………. 𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻4𝐹 > 0 
 
 
  
Chapter 3 : Results and Analysis 
3.1. Results  
In conducting the regression analysis, an initial regression was run to check the relationship between 
each independent variable and the dependent variable. In addition to showing the strength of the 
relationship, these initial regressions formed a basis from which to later check which variables are 
unduly influenced by the addition of other variables. Once this was completed, beginning with 
exposure each variable was added one at a time, checking for problems of correlation and 
multicolinearity at each stage. Furthermore all regressions were run as robust regressions in order to 
correct for potential problems associated with heteroscedasticity and influencers. 
 
This process culminated in a regression using GDP per capita, exposure, population, polity2, distance, 
language, colony, religion, imports and ODA per capita – in line with the framework put forward by 
Clist (2011), but with the inclusion of vulnerability and ODA per capita. Table 8 below gives the 
correlation matrix for the afore-mentioned variables. On the whole, correlation does not appear to be 
a problem. Possible exceptions however are the relationships between imports and colony, and 
language and colony which have a correlation coefficient of 0.5759 and 0.5682 respectively. In order 
to assess whether these cause multicolinearity in the overall model, a Belsley-Kuh-Welsch Test was 
run. When analysing the output of this test, figures that are above 30 indicate that multicolinearity is a 
moderate to severe problem (Williams, 2015). The Belsley-Kuh-Welsch test on this model returned a 
value of 28.44 indicating that multicolinearity is neither a moderate nor severe concern.  
 
Table 8: Correlation Matrix 
 ACCF Exposure Language Distance Religion Colony Polity2 Population ODA GDP Imports 
ACCF 1.000           
Exposure -0.022 1.000          
Language -0.255 -0.054 1.000         
Distance -0.058 0.060 -0.136 1.000        
Religion -0.112 0.031 0.194 -0.293 1.000       
Colony -0.057 0.099 0.568 -0.362 0.114 1.000      
Polity2 0.232 -0.144 -0.048 0.121 -0.029 -0.028 1.000     
Population -0.016 -0.332 0.020 -0.106 0.246 -0.117 -0.129 1.000    
ODA 0.276 0.048 0.164 -0.116 -0.108 0.356 0.195 -0.440 1.000   
GDP -0.021 -0.011 -0.012 0.103 0.138 0.045 0.301 -0.297 0.056 1.000  
Imports 0.188 0.009 0.163 -0.444 -0.042 0.576 0.030 -0.014 0.375 0.163 1.000 
 
Table 9 below gives the final regression output. The R-Squared value for the model is given as 0.2405 
indicating that 24.05% of the variation in ACCF is explained by changes in the independent variables. 
Furthermore the overall P-Value for the model is 0.0020 indicating that R-Squared is significantly 
different from zero, at the 95% level. While the results of the regression are more extensively covered 
in the analysis chapter of this paper, as an introduction, a brief summary is provided in the paragraphs 
below. 
  
Table 9: Final Regression Output 
Linear Regression   Number of Obs. = 132 
   F (10, 121) = 3.00 
   Prob > F = 0.002 
   R-Squared =  0.241 
   Root MSE = 2.358 
     
  Robust     
ACCF Coef. Std. Err.  t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] 
GDP per Capita -0.199 0.255 -0.78 0.437 -0.703 0.306 
Exposure 1.804 4.803 0.38 0.708 -7.705 11.313 
Population 0.300 0.270 1.11 0.268 -0.234 0.834 
Polity2 0.115 0.049 2.35 0.021 0.018 0.212 
Distance -0.030 0.067 -0.45 0.657 -0.163 0.103 
Language -1.483 0.673 -2.20 0.030 -2.816 -0.150 
Colony -0.586 0.783 -0.75 0.456 -2.135 0.964 
Religion -0.210 0.469 -0.45 0.656 -1.139 -0.719 
Imports 0.368 0.309 1.19 0.268 -0.234 0.834 
ODA 0.519 0.192 2.70 0.008 0.138 0.899 
_cons -5.003 6.379 -0.78 0.434 -17.631 7.625 
 
Beginning with the relationship between GDP per Capita and ACCF, the table above shows an inverse 
relationship. This relationship is however not significant and the paper therefore fails to reject the null 
hypothesis for Hypothesis 1A (𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻1𝐴 > 0). Turning to exposure, as anticipated exposure has a 
positive relationship with ACCF. However, as with GDP per capita, this relationship is not significant 
and this paper therefore fails to reject the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 1B (𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻1𝐵 > 0). 
 
Turning to population, while showing a positive relationship to ACCF, the relationship between 
population and ACCF is not statistically significant. As a result we fail to reject the null hypothesis for 
Hypothesis 2 (𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻2 > 0). 
 
The relationship between polity2 and ACCF is positive as expected as well as statistically significant 
at the 95% level. For Hypothesis 3 (𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻3 > 0) therefore, we reject the null hypothesis.  
 
Of the proximity variables, distance, language, colony and religion all show negative relationships 
with ACCF. With the exception of distance where donors were expected to give more to closer 
countries, a positive relationship to ACCF was expected for these proximity variables. However, the 
relationships between ACCF and distance, colony and religion are not significant. We therefore fail to 
reject the null hypotheses for Hypothesis 4A (𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻4𝑎 < 0), 4B (𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻4𝐵 > 0) and 4D 
(𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻4𝐷 > 0). Conversely, while in an unexpected direction, the relationship between language 
and ACCF is statistically significant at the 95% level. We therefore reject the null hypothesis for 
Hypotheses 4C (𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻4𝐶 > 0). Turning to the remaining proximity indicators, trade and ODA 
per capita, both variables show a positive relationship with ACCF. Of these two variable however, 
only ODA per capita shows a statistically significant relationship at the 95% level. We therefore fail 
to reject the null hypothesis for Hypothesis 4E (𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻4𝐸 > 0) and reject the null hypothesis for 
Hypothesis 4F (𝐻0 =  0; 𝐻4𝐹 > 0).  
 
3.2. Analysis 
Drawing on the results outlined above, this paper finds the following responses to its research 
questions. As noted, the central research question for this paper asks what the key determining factors 
are for the receipt of ACCF in SSA countries. The results of this paper show that based on the amended 
4P model, language, an existing aid relationship and policy are key determinants for the receipt of 
ACCF in SSA countries. 
 
The sub-research question for this paper examines the extent to which environmental, economic, 
historical and political factors play a role in determining ACCF flows to SSA countries. In linking this 
question to the amended 4P model, environmental factors are represented by the exposure variable; 
economic factors by GDP per capita; historical factors by the proximity variables; and political factors 
by the policy variable, as measured by polity2. Therefore the answer to the sub-research question, 
based on the amended 4P model, is that historical and political factors appear to play a role in ACCF 
allocation to SSA countries. 
 
An important caveat to note in the analysis that follows is that the amended 4P model only explains 
24.1% of the variance in ACCF flows to SSA countries. There are therefore clearly other factors at 
play which have not been included within the scope of the 4P model. The implication of this is that 
future research would need to expand or amend the model. Furthermore, as noted above, ACCF data 
is only available from 2010. Expanding the time span of the dependent variable is therefore not 
possible at this juncture. Instead, the data set could be expanded to include more recipient countries or 
more donors in order to ascertain if the findings of this paper hold for an expanded set of countries. In 
summary, the findings should be seen in the context of there being a limited number of observations.  
Nevertheless, the model does produce some interesting results. The paragraphs that follow serve to 
provide a more in-depth analysis of these findings, beginning with a closer look at the funding provided 
by the seven donors to SSA countries.  
 
3.2.1. ACCF Flows to SSA Countries from the Seven Donors 
Figure 8 below shows the ACCF flows to the top ten recipients of ACCF in the years under 
consideration9. Together, these recipients represent almost 75% of the average annual inflow of ACCF 
for the region of SSA. As Figure 8 below shows, a large portion of ACCF went to South Africa, Kenya 
and Cape Verde.   
 
Figure 8: ACCF by Recipient and Donor, Average 2010 - 2013, US$ Millions 
 
Source: Graph based on data from OECD, 2015a 
 
Figure 8 above also shows that South Africa, Mauritius, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Nigeria and Gabon 
received the bulk of their ACCF from France; while Kenya and Cape Verde received the bulk of their 
ACCF from Japan. Furthermore, the largest share of ACCF to Ethiopia came from the UK and to Mali, 
from Germany. These numbers are driven by a few big projects. For example, France loaned 
                                                 
9 The figures given here are based on the unlogged versions of the ACCF variable used in the model. The unlogged versions are used to provide a 
description of donor behaviour in SSA in the period under consideration, but were transformed in order to normalise the distribution for the purposes of 
the regression.  
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US$69.894 million for a water and sanitation project in 2010; and US$269.31 million for an urban 
development project in 2013, in South Africa (OECD, 2015a). Similarly, Kenya received a US$125.73 
million loan from Japan in 2010 for an agricultural water services project; and US$51.71 as a grant 
from Sweden for an agricultural project (OECD, 2015a). Cape Verde’s financing in the period is 
dominated by a US$138.64 million loan from Japan in 2013 for a water supply project (OECD, 2015a). 
France also provided water supply project loans to Burkina Faso (US$39.83 million) in 2013; 
Cameroon (US$79.47 million) in 2010; Nigeria (US$78.60 million) in 2012; Gabon (US$72.48 
million) in 2010 (OECD, 2015a). The size of loans are typically larger than those of grants, as shown 
in OECD (2015a) data.  
 
Looking at the above from the perspective of the donor, in the period under consideration Canada 
provided 2.43% of average annual financing, while France provided 42.77%, Germany 10.95%, Japan 
30.46%, the Netherlands 3.43%, Sweden 5.06%, and the UK 4.91% (OECD, 2015a). Therefore in the 
period under consideration Japan and France contributed more than 70% of total annual average funds 
provided. Of the countries therefore there were overall more observations for Japan and France than 
there were for the other five donors. In addition to the size of the ACCF flows to SSA countries, an 
important contextual consideration for the analysis is the type of funding received from the seven 
donors. This is outlined in turn in the paragraphs that follow.  
  
i. ACCF Flows by Type of Financing 
Between 2010 and 2013 an average of US$210.16 million was provided annually by the seven donors 
in the form of grants (OECD, 2015a). For loans this figure was US$266.35 million (OECD, 2015a). 
Therefore based on these annual averages, 44.10% of annual ACCF was in the form of grants and 
55.90% was in the form of loans. When all DAC donors are considered this ratio changes to 58.06% 
in the form of grants and 41.94% in the form of loans (OECD, 2015a). This skewness towards grants 
in ACCF is in line with global trends. The ratio related to the seven donors is therefore slightly 
anomalous. This could be slightly problematic in interpreting this research in that, as noted above, 
ACCF was selected over MCCF for analysis on the basis that the latter predominantly consisted of 
loans, and the main determinant would most likely be the ability to repay the principal and interest 
portion of such a loan. Although this caveat is noteworthy, when analysing the aggregate amounts 
across all countries, the proportion of grants is not heavily skewed. On this basis, the results are still 
considered important. 
 
3.2.2. Historical Factors: Language and an Existing Aid Relationship 
i. Language 
As per the model output, a one unit increase in the language score results in a 1.483 decrease in ACCF. 
If the model comprised of only two variables, ACCF and language, language would explain 6.07% of 
the variance in ACCF. This relationship is unexpected, given that the literature suggests that countries 
with the same language have closer aid ties (Clist, 2011). Clist (2011), for example, notes that for 
France in particular, language is an important determining factor for aid flows.  
 
However, contrary to this conclusion, the bulk of France’s ACCF went to Anglophone countries as per 
Figure 9 below10. This was followed by Francophone countries, and thereafter, by countries in which 
both English and French are official languages. In fact, English-speaking countries form the bulk of 
recipient countries for all donors, with the exception of Germany, where the bulk of funding has gone 
to French speaking countries. 
 
Figure 9: ACCF Allocation by Language 
 
Source: Graph based on data from OECD, 2015a, and Mayer & Zignago, 2011  
 
However, as there are no SSA countries which have any official linguistic links to Dutch, German, 
Swedish or Japanese, it becomes apparent that this language-recipient relationship is conditional.  It is 
postulated that the result is driven by France, which instead of routing financing to Francophone 
                                                 
10 The figures given here are based on the unlogged versions of the ACCF variable used in the model. The unlogged versions are used to provide a 
description of donor behaviour in SSA in the period under consideration, but were transformed in order to normalise the distribution for the purposes of 
the regression. 
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countries, has instead provided the largest allocation to English speaking countries. Clist (2011) notes 
that while France tended to provide ODA to Francophone countries, language as an indicator in general 
can appear contradictory. 
 
Other authors who have drawn conclusions along similar lines include (Anderson, 2012) who notes 
that in analysing 23 DAC countries that the variable for language is signed opposite to what is expected 
and significant in some cases. Finally, another possible explanation for the results could be attributed 
to the fairly limited nature of the data. 
 
ii. Existing Aid Relationship 
In addition to language, a significant result from the regression was that of a positive relationship 
between donor flows of ODA and donor flows ACCF, as measured by ODA per capita and as shown 
in Figure 10 below.  
 
Figure 10: ACCF Allocation by ODA per Capita, Annual Average 2010 - 2013 
 
Source: Graph based on data from OECD, 2015a and OECD QWIDS, 2015 
 
As outlined in the regression output in the results section above, a 1 unit increase in ODA per capita 
results in a 0.519 unit increase in ACCF with a significance level of 0.008%. When regressed by itself, 
an existing aid relationship explains almost 7% of the variance in the model.  
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The positive correlation between ACCF and an existing aid relationship is indicative of closer 
proximity between donor and recipient, and is therefore not particularly surprising. The closer 
countries are, the lower the transactions costs are (Clist, 2011). For example, an existing aid 
relationship implies that the donor has an existing understanding of the country, its processes and its 
institutions. Furthermore, this result makes intuitive sense because the donor would already have 
established finance channels to the recipient and established relationships with organisations present 
in the recipient country. Furthermore, Anderson  (2012) notes that the provision of financing to 
countries where there is an existing relationships is more efficient and that it, in addition, is potentially 
cost saving in that donor countries can establish economies of scale in the recipient country activities.  
 
While this finding makes sense from a donor perspective it is fairly problematic from a vulnerability 
perspective in that it implies that donors are carrying out ACCF in line with their ODA priorities, but 
not necessarily in line with the level of vulnerability in the recipient country. This is echoed in findings 
on the determinants of receiving ODA where need has not been found to be central (Barrett, 2014; 
Clist, 2011; Fuchs et al., 2014 and Hoeffler & Outram, 2011). This has furthermore, been a consistent 
criticism of donor behaviour. With ACCF only being 4 years old for DAC countries, the ‘business-as-
usual’, or rather ‘aid-as-usual’ approach irrespective of the type of aid, is potentially problematic.   
 
3.2.3. Political Factor: Policy 
Finally, turning to the policy variable in the model. As noted there is a positive relationship between 
policy and ACCF flows to SSA countries. A 1 unit increase in the polity2 variable will result in a 0.115 
increase in ACCF; a result which is significant at the 95% level. When regressed without other 
independent variables, ACCF explains 5.16% of variance in the model. This relationship is 
summarised in Figure 11 below.  
 
Figure 11: ACCF Allocation by Average Polity2 Score, 2009 - 2013 
 
 
              Autocracy                                                                                            Democracy 
 
Source: Graph based on data from OECD, 2015 and Marshall et al., 2013 
 
 
As noted in the methodology section above, the polity2 score is a combination of Polity IV’s 
democracy and autocracy scores where negative scores imply autocratic tendencies and positive scores 
imply democratic tendencies (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2013). When calculating whether a country 
leans towards autocracy or democracy, Polity IV considers political participation of a country’s 
citizens, constraints on the chief executive and the competitiveness of executive recruitment (Marshall, 
Gurr, & Jaggers, 2013). Based on this and the results of the amended 4P model then, a country is more 
likely to receive ACCF if it leans towards democracy which in this sense implies a political system 
that characterised by openness, a merit-based civil service, and checks and balances. This relationship 
is outlined in Figure 12 below. 
 
While this result is in line with the hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between policy and 
ACCF, policy selectivity has not been a consistent or key finding in aid literature. Clist (2011), for 
example, finds that policy sensitivity was not an important consideration for the seven donors in the 
4P model. This was with the exception of Sweden and the Netherlands who showed higher policy 
selectivity in the later years of the analysis (Clist, 2011). Nevertheless this finding is indicative of 
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donor countries favouring more transparent systems, the potential benefit of which is that donors are 
better able to monitor their funding.  
 
As noted by Carter (2014), the greater amount of institutional democracy a country has, the better 
absorptive capacity there is for financing. Following this, financing would arguably be better spent on 
the objectives for which it was intended. Figure 12 underscores this theory. Taking a closer look at the 
channels used by the seven donors for ACCF to SSA countries between 2010 and 2013, Figure 12 
shows that the majority of ACCF is directed through the public sector and recipient governments. As 
such donors are more reliant on the institutional quality of the recipient country than they would be if 
the bulk of their ACCF funding was directed through multilateral institutions and NGOs.   
 
Figure 12: ACCF Inflows to SSA from the Seven Donors, by Channel Type, 2010 – 2013, % of Total11 
 
Source: OECD, 2015a 
 
 
  
                                                 
11 Abbreviations: IBRD (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development), WFP (World Food Programme), UNDP (United Nations, FAO ( Food 
and Agricultural Organisation), IUCN (International Union for the Conservation of Nature) CIAGR (Consultative Group for International Agricultural 
Research) Fund CIFR (Centre for International Forestry Research) 
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Chapter 4 : Conclusions and Recommendations 
4.1. Conclusions 
The above analysis has taken a closer look at the statistically significant findings of the amended 4P 
model. The key issues emerging from these findings can be summarised as being related to the 
importance of historical and political factors; to the negative relationship between language and ACCF; 
to the positive relationship between ACCF, and policy and an existing aid relationship; to an ‘aid-as-
usual’ approach to ACCF, and finally to technical considerations and future research. These findings 
are noted in turn in the paragraphs that follow. 
 
4.1.1. The Importance of Historical and Political Factors 
In addressing the central research question, this section shows that, based on results from the amended 
4P model, language, an existing aid relationship, and policy are significantly correlated with ACCF.  
In addressing the sub-research question, this section shows that the aforementioned determining factors 
can be categorised as historical (language and an existing aid relationship) and political (policy). 
 
4.1.2. A Negative Relationship between Language and ACCF Allocation 
The negative relationship between ACCF and language is difficult to explain and slightly anomalous 
given that the donor is often found to be most strongly influenced by historical ties. Our results 
however indicate that France largely provided ACCF to Anglophone countries in the period under 
consideration. This finding warrants further research. 
 
4.1.3. A Positive Relationship between ACCF and, an Existing Aid Relationship and 
Policy 
The relationship between an existing aid relationship and policy, with ACCF is positive, as anticipated. 
Both of these variables have implications for the transaction costs of ACCF funding. The former 
potentially lowers transaction costs in that the donor has already established recipient relationships and 
channels of finance. The latter implies less opacity in funding, and higher absorptive capacities which 
arguably result in more efficient allocation.  
 
4.1.4. An ‘Aid-as-Usual’ Approach to ACCF 
While, as noted above, donors providing ACCF to countries that are more democratic and where there 
is an existing aid relationship potentially reduces transaction costs, it does very little in the way of 
targeting countries that are most vulnerable to climate change. Furthermore, a key concern is that in 
providing ACCF to existing aid partners, donors are taking an ‘aid-as-usual’ approach to ACCF 
funding and not correcting for the potential flaws in existing aid allocation practices.  
  
4.1.5. Technical Considerations and Future Research  
In interpreting the data it is important to bear in mind that this model only explains 24.1% of the 
variance in ACCF flows to SSA. There is therefore the need to conduct more research that will, 
amongst other elements, aim to expand the countries in the data set, and explore additional potential 
variables that could be related to ACCF allocation practices. Furthermore, this paper has raised 
technical issues surrounding the definition of CCF and the uneven reporting practices of donors. 
 
4.2. Recommendations 
In addressing the concerns raised in this paper, this section puts forward recommendations related to 
donor allocation practices and international climate governance. Related to the former, these 
recommendations apply to the incorporation of existing aid effectiveness principles into ACCF 
allocation. Related to the latter, these recommendations apply to the need for better defined ACCF 
targets; and a need to rethink ‘new and additional’ financing. 
 
4.2.1. Donor Allocation Practices 
i. The Incorporation of Aid Effectiveness Principles 
The OECD’s 2005 Paris Declaration advocated for five key principles for aid allocation (OECD, 
2015b). These principles are ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results, and mutual accountability. 
Ownership relates to the use of recipient country strategies and recipient country institutions (OECD, 
2015b). Alignment relates to the use of aid to bolster recipient country plans and institutions (OECD, 
2015b). Harmonisation relates to increased coordination among donor countries in order to avoid 
duplication of effort (OECD, 2015b). Results relate to an emphasis on monitored and measured results; 
and finally, mutual accountability relates to both the recipient and donor being accountable for the use 
of aid (OECD, 2015b). Following the Paris Declaration, 2008’s Accra Agenda built on the above five 
principles of aid effectiveness by emphasising the importance of recipient country ownership and 
delivering results; as well as noting the importance of inclusive partnerships and capacity development 
(OECD, 2015b).  
 
The OECD’s principles on aid effectiveness are based on decades of experience and should apply to 
ACCF allocations. Of particular importance, currently, are the principles of ownership, mutual 
accountability, and results. Nakhooda et al. (2013) for example note that, related to the ownership 
principle, CCF allocations have not, thus far, been centred on local contexts or capacities. Niang et al. 
(2014) add to this by noting that in both ACCF and MCCF the approach has been at the project level, 
impeding the development of recipient capacity. The Sabin Center for Climate Change Law (2015) 
notes that the majority of countries in SSA have developed national adaptation plans within the 
UNFCCC framework. These plans should be used as a starting to point to ensuring ACCF allocation 
is in line with recipient country priorities. In addition to increasing ownership this process would better 
mutual accountability.  
 
Related to the principle of results, the current system of CCF tracking is inadequate in terms of not 
only monitoring results, but in defining the results that are to be monitored. Work therefore needs to 
be done on streamlining reporting processes and better targeting, and defining, the desired results. This 
recommendation is not however restricted to donor allocation practices, but must be extended to the 
UNFCCC, as outlined below. 
 
4.2.2. International Climate Governance 
i. The Need for Better Defined Targets 
In guiding ACCF allocation practices, it is essential that the UNFCCC outline better-defined targets 
and objectives. Brunner and Enting (2014) for example note that while the UNFCCC emphasises 
inputs in the form of monetary requirements, it does not focus on outputs and outcomes. In defining 
outputs and outcomes, the UNFCCC and its signatories will be better able to direct their financing 
efforts.  
 
ii. Rethinking ‘New and Additional’ 
A key tenement of the UNFCCC is the requirement for ‘new and additional’ financing. While this 
approach seeks to ensure that donors amend their aid allocation behaviour for ACCF, the analysis 
above shows that this may not be practical. In addition to the challenge of the ‘aid-as-usual’ approach 
of donors, the ‘new and additional’ financing requirement is challenging in that it aims to separate two 
components that are inextricably linked – development and climate change. Ayers and Huq (2009) for 
example note that climate change and development activities overlap in the sectors of agriculture, 
technology, irrigation and infrastructure. Rather than separating development assistance and ACCF it 
is perhaps advisable that the focus be on climate resilient development, defined as “…development 
which is based on an assessment of the impacts of climate change and which has integrated climate 
change adaptation measures into its policies, plans and activities” (OECD, 2011: 16). Ayers and Huq 
(2009) refer to this as ‘mainstreaming’ and propose four steps to accomplish this, as shown in Figure 
13 below.  
 
Figure 13: Mainstreaming Climate Change in Development 
 
Source: Ayers and Huq, 2009 
 
The first step relates to raising awareness on climate change and ensuring that it is supported by 
scientific research (Ayers & Huq, 2009). The second step relates to providing training and information 
to planners, researchers, communities , policy makers and civil society; while the third step relates to 
establishing pilot adaptation and mitigation programmes based on the knowledge garnered in step one 
and disbursed in step two (Ayers and Huq, 2009). Finally, step four requires that the lessons from the 
pilot programmes be built into policy and planning, thereby mainstreaming climate change 
considerations into development.  
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